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ABSTRACT
EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
UNDER FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND 
INCREASING RETURNS
H. Niir Ata
M. A. in Economics
Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Erdem Başçı 
August, 2000
In this work we analyze the existence of equilibrium under increasing returns 
in a limited participation model. There arc two types of agents. Producer type 
has an increasing returns to scale (IRS) technology with no labor endowment 
while worker type has onh' labor endowment. Economy consists of three pe­
riods. At each period, due to cash-in-advance constraints imposed on factor 
purchases, goods market opens after the labor market closes. Total money 
stock is assumed to be constant. With this setup we were able to establish the 
existence and uniqueness of competitive equlibrium with increasing returns for 
the special case that the agent’s preferences are being represented by logarith­
mic utility.
heyteords and Phrases: Inreasing Returns, Limited Participation, Fiat 
money.
Ill
ÖZET
FİNANSAL KISITLAR VE ÖLÇEĞE GÖRE ARTAN 
GETİRİ ALTINDA REKABETÇİ DENGENİN 
VARLIĞI İLE İLGİLİ BİR ARAŞTIRMA
H. Nur Ata
Ekonomi Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
Danışman: Yar. Doç. Dr. Erdem Başçı 
Ağustos, 2000
Bu çalışmada sonlu periyotlu bir modelde, üretimde finansal kısıtlar ve ölçeğe 
göre artan getiri altında rekabetçi dengenin varlığı araştırıldı. Ekonomide iki 
tip ajanımız var. Üreticinin, ölçeğe göre artan getiri veren üretim teknolojisine 
sahip olduğunu ve işgücü arz etmediğini, Lşçinin ise sadece işgücüne sahip olduğ 
unu varsayıyoruz. Her periyotta faktör piyasasındaki ön ödeme kısıtı nedeniyle, 
rnal piyasası emek piyasası kapandıktan sonra açılabiliyor ve toplam para stoğu 
değişmiyor. Bu biçimde tanımlanmış bir ekonomide genel dengenin varlığı 
ve tekliği, ajanların fayda fonksiyonlarının logaritmik olduğu özel durum için 
ispatlanmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler re Ifadeler.Olçege Göre .'\rtan Getiri, On Ödeme Kısıtı, 
Kâğıt Para.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is well known that the competitive mechanism fails in the presence of increas­
ing returns. In general, competitive equilibria do not exist. This fact can be 
observed even in the case of one consumer-one producer economy. Because if 
firm type agent has increasing returns to scale (IRS) technology, not even local 
profit maximization can be guaranteed at the prices that could support optimal 
tillocation which maximizes consumer type’s welfare. Moreover the presence of 
non-convexities prevents the pricing system from supporting the Pareto opti­
mal allocation as a profit maximizing choice. This failure motivated the search 
for alternative mechanisms and resulted in the theory of marginal cost pric­
ing (MCP).^In this new theory the second welfare theorem is reformulated as 
follows;
If an allocation is Pareto optimal, then there exists prices and wealth levels 
such that (i) firms follow the special pricing rule which requires that the price 
of outpxit equals its marginal cost (ii) consumers maximize their utility (iii) 
markets clear. As it is obvious by (ii), MCP neglects the second order marginal 
conditions but satisfaction of first order conditions itself does not ensure that 
the allocation is Pareto optimal. Moreover condition (ii) means that in the
^MCP idea has been first introduced by Harold Hotelling (1938)
MCP equilibrium firms do not neccessarily maximize profits.
Until the end of 1970’s this statement of the second welfare theorem Wtis 
formulated and generalized.(Guesnerie (1975), Khan and Vohra (1987), Bon- 
nisseau and Cournet (1988)). There are also some papers which are concerned 
with the existence of equilibrium ( Dierker, Guesnerie, Neuefeind (1985), Vohra 
(1988)). The whole literature is vast and will not be surveyed here. For a typ­
ical example w'hich deals with the existence of MCP equilibrium, one may one 
to look at the Paulina Beato’s 1982 paper. Donald and Heal’s 1983 paper 
would also be helpful.
There are now many results on the existence of marginal cost pricing equi­
librium:
‘'It is recently that increasing returns have been rigorously incorporated into 
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. The literature has focused on op­
timality issues as well as the existence of equilibrium. With an appropriate 
generalization of the notion of "marginal cost prices” it has become possible 
to derive a generalized second welfare theorem, assei'ting that corresponding to 
every Pareto optimal allocation there exists a vector of marginal cost prices for 
the firms such that, evaluated at these prices, every consumer’s expenditures are 
minimized, subject to the given utility levels. This represents simultaneously a 
generalization of the second welfare theorem of Arrow and Debreu to economics 
with nonconvex production sets and a generalization of the Hotelling’s re.sult 
on the iiecessity of marginal cost pricing to the nonsmooth context. This result 
can, of course, be interpreted to say every Pareto optimal allocation can be 
sustained as a marginal cost pricing equilibrium ivith a suitable redistribution 
of income. Interestingly, it turns out that if the income distribution is fixed, 
then none of the marginal cost pricing equUibria may be Pare to optimal. Thus 
important normative issues concerning optimal regulation of increasing returns 
(inns remain open. .\’e vert he less, irrespesfive of which pricing rule is proposed.
on normative or on positive grounds, the equlibrium existence issue will remain 
an important part of the theory.” (R. Vohra, 1992, pp 859-60)
Efficiency considerations in the context of second welfare theorem is out of 
the scope of this thesis and will not be pursued here. We analyze the problem 
of the existence of competitive equilibrium with increasing returns but in a 
limited participation model. Concerning this property of the model that луе 
used, this is a new contribution to the existing literature.
Limited participation models have been used in macroeconomic й’ателуогк 
after the paper of Fuerst (1992). Fuerst uses a representative family frame­
work, where credit markets were operative. Başçı and Sağlam (1999) studies 
a version with heterogenous agents and without the credit markets. With 
the assumption that the labor market opens before the goods market (with 
agents having CRS production technology) they observe that the presence of 
cash-in-advance requirement in the labor market limits the demand for labor. 
Therefore an equilibrium with real wage below the marginal product of labor 
can be sustained. We use a version of this model with three period and with 
IRS technolog}'  ^ in poduction.
We introduce heterogeneity by allowing two t3'pes of representative agents, 
a worker and a producer. Market organization is such that at each period, 
labor market opens before the goods market and producer type faces a cash 
constraint in his factor payments. He is restricted in his labor purchases with 
the amount of money he holds at beginning of each period. Worker type has 
only labor endowment which he can supply in return for money to purchase 
his consumption good. Total monej' stock in the economy is assumed to be 
constant.
In this setup \vc succesfully give a solution to the problem of maximizing 
a non-concave function on a non-convex constraint set. Moreover we establish 
the existence and uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium in the presence of a
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representitive firm type having IRS technology and a representitive worker type 
with labor endowment and when both agents have logarithmic instantenous 
utility functions which represents their preferences over the economy’s single 
consumption good.
The thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 general model is presented 
as well as the assumptions. The solution to the maximization problem of the 
producer type agent is given in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 gives the existence result 
and proof. Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
The M odel
In our hypothetical finite-horizon economy, at each time /,  ^ we have two 
different types of agents, differing in their access to production technology; 
“workers” and “producers”. There are two types of commodities: a factor of 
production, labor Li cind a nonstorable consumption good, apple qt. Agent 1 
(worker) has only labor endowment L > 0 and has no access to production 
technology while agent 2 (producer) has an IRS technology f 2(L) =  to 
convert labor into apples. One can have apples only through these production 
possibilities i.e initially there are no endowment of apples.
Agents are indexed by i — 1,2. Preferences of the agents over the con­
sumption good, apple, (and only the consumption good because we assume 
that neither one values leisure) are represented by the same instantenous util­
ity function U. Thus the preferences over the lifetime consumption for both 
types of agents are given by an additively separable form S/_o/3T/(C,-.t) where 
e  (0,1) is the common discount factor, and C,\i is the consumption of agent 
i at time t. We assume that U is twice continuously differentiable U(.)' > 0 
and t/"(.) < 0.
The economy operates with money under the cash-in-advance constraints in
’Time is inde.xed by / and period t is the time interval between /. and / -f 1.
both labor and apple markets. Money is perfectly storable and denotes the 
money holding of agent i at time 1. VVe assume that initially all the currency 
in the economy, Mo, is owned by agent 2, that is, Mi,o — 0 and M2,o =  Mq. 
We assume that the total money stock does not change over time. (The paper 
money is backed by the government with a promised price of ( ^ )  in the last 
period).
2.1 Markets
We will consider a three period (t=0,l,2) market organization in which labor 
market opens before the goods market. In period 0, agent 2 (since he has 
initially all the currency in the economy) purcha.ses labor and we assume that 
he does so with all of his money i.e L24 =  Then he produces apples with 
the IRS technology. After the production of apples is complete agent 1 has 
money, agent 2 has apples and goods market opens. Agent 2 sells his apples to 
agent 1 in return for monej' and now both agent 1 and agent 2 has apples to 
consume and money to be used for the next period. In the last period, money 
held by agents is backed by the government by selling apples to them.
With the endowment structure described above and given the strictly posi­
tive prices u?(. Pi for each period t, finite horizon utilitj’ maximization problem 
of the two agents can be written as
Agent 1 (Worker)
(P I) m ux ^  .¿i't/(Ci,i)
(=0
subject to for all t
d<-i.i = fit
L\ < L
A/i,t+i = ^l\,t 4* u.’iAj — ptq'l
where Mi^t^Ci,t,qf,Lt ^  0 and A/i,o = 0 is given. 
Agent 2 (Producer)
i = 2
(P2) maxY^^^U{C2,t)
t=o
subject to for all t
^  _  1 for l f ! 2
[ / ( / .? )  for ¿ = 2
< M2,t
■iV/2,i+l =  M2,t -  WtL^  + ptQt
where M2,u > 0 and = M2,3 =  0,M2,o = Mq is given.
Assume that that is, assume that agent 2 uses all of his money
to purchase labor,  ^ then problem (P2) becomes
(P2)'
t=2
TrtaxY^P^U{C2,t)
t=o
subject to for all t
C2,t — f' f C - t )  -  l!  ‘ 5^  2
/ ( i ^ )  for ( = 2
(2.1)
M2,t < M2,t (trivially) (2.2)
<7i =
2,^ +1
Pt
(2.3)
Avhere A/2,t, C2,t, qf, Lf > 0  and q^  = ^/2,3 = 0, A/2,0 =  Mo is given.
Substituting (2.3) into (2.1) and then (2.1) into the objective function prob­
lem becomes
"^ The rationale behind the assumption Li  ^ ^  will be more understandable when we 
impose some kind of “profitability condition’· later on in chapter 4.
t=2 M2,t+l ^(P2)" m a x Y ^ i3 U j{ f{ - ^ ) -
f^o Pt
subject to for all i = 0, · · ·, 2
> 0
m  Pt
where M2,t > 0, jV/2,3 = 0, M2,o = Mq > 0 and ¡3 € (0,1).
An equilibrium in this economy consists of a finite sequence of apple prices, 
money wages, labor demands, labor supplies, apple demands, apple supplies 
and money holdings by the two agents such that at each date, demands, sup­
plies and money holdings are optimal under the given wage and price sequences, 
demand equals supply in both labor and apple markets and money holdings 
sum up to the total money supply at each time.
Formally we say that < pt, Wt,Lf,Ll and < qf,qt,M\^t+i,M2,t+i >Lo 
is an equilibrium if
(0 < < qf,Mi^t+\ >Lo ¡solves (PI) and
< 14  >{=o> < HUM2,tJri ><=o solves (P2) under < Wt,pt >1=q 
{ii) Li = Lt Vt 
(iii) qf = qi for  t = 0,1 
{Hi) -f M2,t+i =  A/ for  i =  0,1
With tlie afforementioned assumption that for both types of agents we have
Li,t = —  Vz-=1,2
it is somewhat simpler to deduce the "optimal” behaviour of agent 1, worker. 
For this reason we will postpone dealing with the problem of agent 1 until the 
chapter 4 which we will give the existence results of the competitive equilibrium 
of the hyphothetical economy in c|uestion.
Most of the following analysis will be an attempt to find a solution to agent 
2 ’s optimization problem. Therefore we will drop the index i in variables of in­
terest and the term “optimization problem” will refer to agent 2’s optimization 
problem until chapter 4.
2.2 Producer’s Optimization Problem
Let V : R \ and hi : R i R+ for i — I , · · ·, 5 be defined as
V{Mi, M,) =  £ ? ( / ( — ) -  — ) +  / « / ( / ( — ) -  — ) +  0 ‘U(n —  ))Wo po m  Pi IV2
III “  Ml > 0
fl2 — M2 ^  0
/,,3 =  a  =  / ( - ) -  —  > 0
1^^0 Po
h, = C’l =  f ( ^ )  -  ^  > 0
UJl Pi
/»5=6’2 = / (  — ) > 0  
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where U is the twice continuously differentiable, instantenous utility function 
satisfying U'{.) > 0 ,U "{.) < 0 and lİn\._o = 00. f denotes the IRS
production function and satisfies f '{L) > 0, /"(T) > 0 . All the parameters 
{iOt,pt,Mo,l3}j^Q are assumed to be strictly positive, j3 is the discount factor,
¡3 e  (0,1).^
Three period utility maximization problem of the agent 2 can then be re­
formulated as
waxV{Mi,  M2) over the constraint set 
r  = {(M l,M 2) e E^|/i.(M i,M2) > 0 i = 1,· · · ,5}
Note that the objective function V' is bounded above.
M2
Ml
Figure 2.1: Constraint Set
2.3 Properties of the Constraint Set
Figure 2.1 shows the constraint set F on the (A/1 .M 2) plane where M i,A l2 G
R l-
It is easy to see that the set F C is compact (closed and bounded) and 
non-convex. On the nonlinear section M2 = Pi f ( ‘^ )  we have C\ = 0. on the 
vertical line A/| = P o f i ^ )  we have Co = 0 and the horizontal line A/2 = 0 is 
the set of points (A/i,A/9) where C'2 = 0. At the corners which are numbered 
by 1,2,3 we have Ci = C’2 = 0, Ci = C’o =  0, C'2 = C'o = 0 respectively.
At point (A/i, A/2) € intV, the distance f/i = p i / ( ^ )  —A/2 = PiCh measures 
the first period consumption and (U ~ Po.f{^) — A-/] = poC'o measures the 
second period consuniption. Distance from the point (A/]. A/2) = x to the 
horizontal line (Mi axis) is a monotone transformation (/(CC) of the third period
10
consumption C2. That is ¿3 = M2 — *«2/ ”* (<^ 2) = fl^ (C'2)
^The production function f  is a continuous, strictly increasing function (of L) hence it 
has an inverse and = <7 is a monotone transformation.
11
Chapter 3
Solution
3.1 Existence of Solution to Producer’s Opti­
mization Problem
If the constraint set F were convex and the objective function V were con­
cave and continuous on F then the Kuhn-Tiicker sufficient conditions would 
be applicable to our problem. Clearly F is not convex and V is not concave, 
moreover V is not continuous on the boundary, <9F, for certain types of util­
ity functions like logarithmic ones. Proposition 3.2 states that even if this is 
the case, imposing the following condition on V  guarantees the existence of a 
global maximum x* of which is in the interior of the constraint set F where
F =  { (M ,, M2) e  R'^|/ii(M i, M 2) >  0 i =  1, · · · , 0}
The following definition is needed before stating the related condition:
D efinition 3.1 Let 'Í : [0,1] —» F be a curve and let A be its tangent vector 
field. Define the derivative ^
DaV'ívI/ÍO)) = lim-i-{V(vk(c)) -  \/(vT/(0))}0 c
^Indeed llus dcritmlive is Icnown as the Lie daivative but we used here a special form of 
if adapted to scalar functions. (.Abraham, Marsdcii. Raiiu (I98S))
MZ
Figure 3.1: Illustration of Condition*
We will impose the following condition on V':
Condition*: For all x G 5F there exists 'Px : [0,1] —» F with 4'x(0) = x such 
that DaV (^x(0)) > 0
Proposition 3.2 Assume that the function V is continuous on intT and that 
for any given parameter set, V satisfies condition’’. Then a global maxi­
mum X* = (All, M2 ) € intV exists to the inequality constraint problem 
jnaxV'(Mi,M2) over the constraint set F. Therefore the point x* satisfies the 
Kuhn-Tucker first order (necessary) conditions for a 7naximum, that is there 
exists A* such that the following conditions are met.
[/FT* — 1] A* > 0 and AJ'/i,(x*) = 0 for z = 1, · · ·, 5 
[AT -  2] DV(x*) + ¿  ArD/i,(x*) = 0
1=1
Proof: Take the point x  € dV such that K(x) > F’(x) Vx € <9F. Such an 
X exists because we know that the function is bounded above. Define the 
set Kxf  = {x'l ||x — x^ ll < e) n F. Since V’ satisfies condition* 3 at least one
13
xo € intKx^i such that F(xo) > V^ (x)· Note that ^(0) = x  implies ^  ^  dT 
since X is the maximum on ^F. Fix Xo and e' > 0 such that Xo € dT^i where 
Ft« = r\Ux6ar -^ 'x.e'· (see figure 3.2). Note that Ft» C F is a compact set and V  
is continuous on Ft'. Then by Weierstrass Theorem 3x* 6 a r9mo.T{V(x)|x € 
Ft'} which implies V (^x“) > F(xo) > l^(x)· Since V  is continuous on the 
interior of F this argument is valid for all e > 0. Hence x* is the maximum of 
V on F as well. Moreover x* 6 niiF.D
R em ark  3.3 Note that this proof is valid regardless of the dimension and ge­
ometry ofV, provided that F is compact. This means that we have an existence 
result for the n-period economy. However there are serious technical difficulties 
in solving [Ml,· ■ ·, Mjt) explicitly. Therefore we prefered to give the existence 
reult for n = 2 .
R em ark  3.4 noted earlier this proof is valid only when the objective func­
tion V is continuous on intT. .4 typical example is obtained for the case where 
U(C)=lnC. With a minor modification same lines of arguments used in the 
proof of proposition 3.2 can be used to prove the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5 Assume now that the objective function V is continuous every­
where on F. Proposition 3.2 is .still valid.
Proof: Take the point x € 5F such that F(x) > V'(x) Vx 6 OT. Such iui x 
exists because we know that the function V is bounded above. By condition* 
there exists Xq € miF such that F(xo) > F(x). But since F is compact and V  is 
continuous on F, by Weierstrass Theorem 3 x* € n;Y/ma.r{y(x)j;r € F).Hence 
F(x*) > F(xo) > F(x)· Thus X* 6 intV. □
For X* €  intr, we have /?,(x’) >  0 V? = 1, · · · , 5. Thus [A T -1] is satisfied at 
(x*, A*) with A* = 0 Vi = 1, · · · ,5. Therefore [AT — 2] reduces to DV^(x“) = 0.
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M2 M2
Ml Ml
Figure 3.2: Illustraion of the proof of proposition 3.2
Constraint qualification (C.Q) is automatically satisfied at x* because the set 
of effective constraints /i£ is empty. In our problem, [KT — 2] can be written 
as
dV dV- -  =  0 ¿ =  l , - - - ,2 or ^ = 0
dxi dMi
For three period (t=0,l,2) this is equivalent to
dV
dMo
=  0 (3.1)
Pa ■ ioq Po lOi · wj p, ' rui
0 (3.2)
- t ^ ' ( / ( — ) - — ) + — 1'^'(/(— ) ) / ( — ) = 0 (3.3)
P i  Wj Pi i02 102
or in terms of Ct variables
- } - U \ C o ) + — U \ C x ) f { ^ )  =  0
Po U)i lOi
- -U '{ C ,)+ ^ — U \C 2) f { — ) = 0
Pi «?2 W2
(3.4)
(3.5)
If we have a unique point (x*, A*) which satisfies [KT — 2], it follows that this 
point also identifies the problem’s global maximum x*.
15
R em ark 3.6 We at first thought that imposing the Inada Condition , 
limc_o =  oOj utility function U{C) (instead of condition*) would
be enough to ensure that the optimum will not occur at the boundary of (our con­
straint set) r .  Natural examples woidd then be U{C) =  InC and U(C) =  \/C, 
both of which satisfy the so called “Inada condition’^  But somewhat surpris­
ingly U{C) =  s/C  appeared as a counterexample to this conjecture. I f  one tries 
to solve the equations (with U{C) = \/C )
(3.6)
dMx ’ 0 M 2
one will see that the existence of the solution depends on the parameter tmlues, 
a fact which contradicts with the conclusion of the proposition 3.2 that there 
exists optima for any given parameter set. For example with all the parameters 
of interest {xvt,pi, Mo]J_q, except fi, set equal to one, equation 3.6 leads to the 
following set of equations to be solved :
1
1) M2 = M f -
2) M2 = -  1)M^
Equaling 3.7 and 3.8 we get the cubic equation
(3.7)
(3.8)
1
+ - ^  = 0 (3.9)
which has double root when M\ — 0 or My — |  with c^ritical = 
means that for < ficrUicai equation 3.9 has no positive real solution at all.
The simple reason for F(C) = y/C be appearing as a counter example is 
that the behaviour of the value function V{M\ , M2) depends on the ¡3 values. 
Following observations can be made :
C ase(l): 0 < /3 < |
With 7/>(0) =  (0,0) =  x.we have Da < 0 and global maximum accurs at 
the point X 071 the boundary, (see figure 3.3).
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C ase(2):  ^ < fi < (|j)^
Let X =  ( 0 , 0 )  and x  =  ( 1 , 0 ) .  Then with HO) =  x for all x € (x,x) we 
have DxV < 0 and maxirnum occurs at (I ~ 4^ i 0 ) on the boundary, (see figure
Case(3): fi > (§5)^· this case maximum occurs at x* € iniT.(see figure
3.5)
Figure 3.3: fi - 0.4
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Figure 3.4: ß = 0.7
Figure 3.5: ß = 0.9 
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R em ark  3.7 PlTi«/ we observe here is that when /3 is low {¡3 <' |) ,  agent 2 
chooses to consume all he/she has at period O.that is, does not hold currency to 
be used for the next period. As ¡3 rises, agent 2 discounts future consumption 
less and we observe a consumption smoothing behaviour. For some ^  > Pcriticai 
we have Cq,C \,C 2 > 0. With this switching behaviour of the optimum, this 
problem looks like a "bang-bang” optimal control problem. (Bryson, Yu-Chi-Ho 
(1975)}. The name ”bang-bang” comes from the fact that the controls move 
.suddenly from one point on the boundary of the feasible control region to another 
point on the boundary. It would be interesting to try to formulate our problem, 
in this way and see its implications, which will not be pursued here.
3.2 Unique Solution For Logarithmic U tility
It is straigtforward to check that the objective function V satisfies condition* 
if we choose the intantenous utility function U{C) from the logarithmic family. 
Then proposition 3.2 says that there exists an interior global maximum x* of 
V^  For the uniqueness of x* we will use the following proposition proof of which 
can easil}r be clone by using ordinary calculus.
P roposition  3.8 Let g\,g2 '■ [a-o,oo) —»■ R, g\,g2 € oo) he two functions 
satisfying the following conditions:
(«) <?i(-ro) <  92M  
(ii) g\{xo) < g'^ixo)
{Hi) g'((x) > g2{x) V.T > .ro
(mj) 3x > ;ro such that gi{x) > g2(x)
Then there exists a unique point .i G (.XorT) .such that g\{x) — g2(3')·
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Proof: Consider the difference function f{x)  =  gi{x) — gzix). Clearly f{x)  
satisfies the following conditions:
( 0  f{xo) < 0
(m) /'(.To) < 0
{Hi) f i x )  > 0 Vt > .To
(iv) 3 t > To such that f{x)  > 0
Using condition (¿¿) we can say that 3c > 0 such that /(.To +  c) < 0. Also from 
condition (iv) we know that 3t > Xo such that f {x)  > 0. But then “Mean 
Value Theorem of calculus says that 3t € (to, t ) such that /(.t) =  0. This 
proves the existence of t.
For the uniqueness of x, assume contrary. That is assume that f{x)  = 
/ ( t) =  0 for some x where To < .t < t < t . By Rolle’s Theorem 3 ti ,T2 such 
that To < .Ti < X < T'2 < .T < T, at which / '( t i) =  /'(.T2) = 0. Again applying 
Rolle’s Theorem to / ',  we can say that 3 .T3 > ,to such that /"(T 3) =  0 which 
contradicts with condition {in). This proves the uniqueness of x. □
If we assume that iJ{C) = InC conditions .3.4 and 3.5 becomes
1( - J - )__  ^
 ^wi ’ (til ^ Mzy loi
^ P o ^  ^ Ujf P i f
( ^ )  = 0
I^V2 iM ly  W2V p\ f V lit* ;
(3.10)
(3.11)
Let M\ =  .T and solve for M2 in terms of M\ in 3.10 and 3.11 to get
Pi(l + 2/3) 2
gi{x) = ------^— -;»·
</2(t) =
w\
2l3p,
'2ppoPi Ml 
WqwI
X
( 1 + 2 ^ K
.2
It is easy to check that with To = 0 and t = p o f { ^ )  = conditions
Wo U’q
{i — iv) of proposition 3.8 are satisfied. This means that equations 3 .10  and
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3.11 can be solved to find the unique solution x” =  (M j, M2 ) which will be the 
unique global maximum of our optimization problem with U{C) = /nC, if we 
refer to propositions 3.2.
From 3.10 we have
(1 +  2 0 )M^ -  ^ M 2  - 2Щ хро‘· ^  =  0
Pi Щ
M l
(3.12)
and from 3.11 we have
„  2Д М / 
(1 +  2/?)'” «.?
(3.13)
Substitute (3.13) into (3.12) to get
(1 +  2 0 )M l -  -  2^роЩ-Мг = 0
(1 +  2)0)' tVn
or, equivalently
Мг -  2 ) 0 ^ ^ }  =  0
(1 + 2/3) tUn
which has two solutions
Mj“ =  0 or Mj* = 2 0 (1 + 2 0 ) Ml
(l + 2/3 + 4)02)^‘’'u;g
A[* Ф 0 because (M^^M^) € intV by proposition 3.2. Thus we have
^  (2 0 )^ { l+ 2 0 ) pIpi ,
2 (1 + 2/3 +  4;02)2«;?го^  ^ °
(jVffjM^) is the unique solution pair that we are searching for.
21
Chapter 4
General equlilibrium
We are now ready to state our existence result on general competitive equilib­
rium.
4.1 Existence of Competitive Equilibrium
Let Mq = M > Q be the initial money agent 2 has and L > 0 be the labor 
endowent of agent 1.
P roposition 4.1 An equilibrium exists in this economy with U{C) = InC and 
f{L)  =  and is given by
U,, =  =  Vi (4.1)
M (1-f- 2^ -f- 4,d )^ 
^  r  2/?(l-h2/3) (4.2)
M { l + 2^) 
2/3 (4.3)
/ M (4.4)
= 11 = LW t (4..··,)
(ft =  (ft = —  for t = 0 , l
Pt
(4.6)
= 0 M2,i+i = M for  / = 0,1 
c ,., = <ii = — v t
P t_
C2,t = f ( L ) - —  for  i = 0,l  
Pi
C2.T = f(L) T  = 2
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9) 
(4.10)
Proof: For money market clearing we must have M2,t+i = M  for i =  0,1 in 
equilibrium since =  0 for i =  0,1. Note that such a money holding
plan is feasible and optimal for agent 2 by proposition 3.2 It is feasible because 
(Mf, M^) G in tr  hence budget constraints are satisfied at (Mj*, Mj). It is opti­
mal because (Mi, M'f) maodmizes the discounted sum of utilities , V. Therefore 
from the money market clearing we have the following two eqxiations:
2/3(1-h 2/?)
(1 + 2 /J+ 4^> )’^ «.J
(4.11)
^  _  (2/?)3(l+2/3) ^  
(1 -1- 2 ^ -t- 4/32)2
(4.12)
Labor market clearing conditions L f =  L  =  L f  =  ^ Vi can be used to find
: money wages lOt:
M
lOo =  tOi =  W2 =  ■ =■
L·
(4.1,3)
Substituting (4.13) into (4.11) and (4.12) prices can be solved:
M { \ +  2/3 4y32) 
~ t  2/?( 1+2/3) (4.14)
M  (1 -f- 23) 
~ V  2/3
(4.15)
O ptim ality  For A gent 1:
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(i) Supplying L > 0 for all t is always optimal for agent 1 because his utility 
is strictly increasing in Lj. To see this consider the agent I ’s optimization 
problem:
Pt
max > p U{----------------V — L>t)
t=o
subject to for all t
Mt -  Mt+i , tt'(
< P,
/ 4 < i
, j-s\ d+ — /vj -  qt 
Pt
Mi,t+i =  Mx,t +  W ill -  ptqf
where M t,L\ > 0 and Mx^ = 0 is given. Since ^  > 0 and U'{) > 0, 
increases if L\ increases. Therefore supplying L is optimal for agent 1 .
(ii)Holding zero currency at each period is optimal for agent 1, when the 
Ibllowing condition is satisfied at each period:
U'{Ct) > -^^U 'iC t+ x)
Pt-^ i
(4.16)
At period 0 , with C1(C) = tnC and C, = p, =  po, p,+i = pi, C,+i = 
above condition becomes ¡3 < I therefore it is automatically satisfied.For the 
other periods same argument applies.
Optimality For Agent 2:
Last period deserves attention. .4gent 2 has two choices:
(i) He does not produce apples and uses his money to purchase apples from the 
government at
(ii) he hires labor (L), produces ( / ( ^ )  = /(L )) and consumes all.
We want to make agent 2 to hire labor and produce apples so p  ^ must be 
set to satify
V { ^ )  < C ( /(— )) (t.lT)
P2 W’2
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Since (/'(.) > 0 this means pj > j ^ ·  So with the last periods price p2 is set 
at P2, agent 2 will hire labor L, produce f{L)  and consumes all. Government 
sells apples to agent 1 at pj? thus agentl consumes Ci,2 = ^  which is clearly 
decreasing in p^.
R em ark  4.2 Since toe have pj G (-^ ^ ,00) the optimal policy would be to set 
P2 = + e for arbitrarily small e > 0 .
Indeed the condition pj > can be tonght of as a profitability  con­
dition  and should hold at each period. But when we look at the equilibrium 
prices po,pi we see that this condition is automatically satisfied for the other 
periods.
It is now clear that agent 1 and agent 2 are maximized at the described 
equilibrium. This completes the proof.□
4.2 Uniqueness of Competitive Equilibrium
In chapter 2 we showed that optimal allocations are unique for
U{C) =  InC and f {L) = L^. Money and labor market clearing was used 
to find equlibrium prices po, pi.
P roposition 4.3 Prices po and p\ are the unique prices that support the com­
petitive equilibrium which is given by proposition 4-1·
Proof:At the equlibrium we have wt =  ^  with M1 .A/2 = hi. Thus F.O.CL·
becomes
- V ( n L ) - - ) + ^ U ’{f {L)) / {L)  = 0 (-U 8 )
Pi Pi M
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■ V ( / ( i ) - ^ ) + = i / ' ( / ( i ) - - ^ ) / ( i )  =  0 (4.19)Po Po M Pi
Taking the total differentials we get
{^£ /'(C .) + ^ r ( C , ) ( ^ ) ) d p .  =  0 (4.20)
(V '(C „ )-^ i/" (C o ))d p „  + ^/'(I)C /"(C ,)dp, = 0 (4.21)
Po Po Pi
From (4.20) we have
dpi — 0 or Pi — MU"{Ci)
U'{Ci)
< 0 (4.22)
and from (4.21) we have:
dpo
d p i
fnL)U "{C i)
(4.23)
Looking at 4.23 tvesee that ^  < 0 iff ;)o < ® which is impossible
by the assumption of strictly positive prices. Again by 4.23 we have ^  > 0 iff 
Po > which is trivial. For the same reason 4.22 implies dpi =  0 , that
i.s, p\ is constant. Therefore equations (4.20) and (4.21) can be solved to find 
the unique solution (po,Pi) which is given by proposition 4.1 at the beginning 
of this chapter. This completes the proof. □
4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section we conduct comparative statics to see how changes in ¡3^   ^ affect 
prices poiPi- We see that equilibrium prices po and pi decrease with ¡32 so 
with impatient firm type (low ¡3) po and pi will be higher at the equilibrium 
reducing the real value of apples.
102 .stands for ¡3 of agent 2 (producer).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Concerning the structure of the model used here, our existence results are not 
directly comparable with the ones in the existing literature. Almost all of them 
use standard assumptions of the classical Arrow-Debreu model except for con­
vexity of the production set. Existence issue is analyzed in this framework and 
results are obtained when firms follow special pricing rules without necessarily 
maximizing profits. Moreover, important part of the theory is devoted to the 
efficiency considerations (in the context of the second welfare theorem) which is 
not studied here. Nevertheless, our findings are interesting. We, in a compet­
itive setup, showed the existence of equilibrium under increasing returns with 
firm tj'pe agent making positive profits. There is one possible explanation for 
this nonstandard result:
We assume that factor payments must be paid in cash and producer can 
not use the money earned from selling output in the goods market at period i, 
to pay for period t factor services. This limits the demand for labor. Therefore 
producer does not face unbounded increasing returns in the sense that there 
is an upper bound on the labor input used in production. This makes us 
think that the limited participation assumption as well as the finite Time is 
responsible for the existence result.
¿1
If one looks at the equilibrium prices, one will see that the last period’s 
price P2 can be set arbitrarily large without distorting the equilibrium. This 
means that we have an equilibrium ,in a finite horizon economy, with valued 
fiat money. There are many examples in the literature on the existence of equi­
libria (even without the cash-in-advance constraints) with valued fiat money 
(Benveniste, Cass (1986), Kiyotaki, Wright (1988)). But it is well known that 
finite horizon makes the value of money unstable because agents do not want 
to hold money near horizon (McCabe (1989)). For this reason it is interesting 
to see the possibility that even if the horizon is finite, individuals may want to 
hold money. Nevertheless, this result is a peculinarity of the logarithmic utility 
function. Moreover the motivation of this attribute, the role of the government, 
is a real weakness in the model.
It would be a natural extension to search for the competitive equilibrium 
with infinitely lived agents. Unfortunately, non-concavity of objective function 
causes problems in the application of dynamic optimization techniques. It is 
not impossible to overcome this technical difficulty but one should not expect 
to get the the existence result easily. Indeed Sotomayor, in his 1987 paper, 
claims that, under certain restrictions, the value function for the dynamic op­
timization problem (resulting from a discrete time one-good model of optimal 
accumulation) is concave and the optimal stationary policy exhibits properties 
similar to that obtained in the model where the technology is assumed to be 
convex. However later on Roy (1993) showes that the conditions on the utility 
and production function functions imposed in Sotomayor’s paper are insuffi­
cient to ensure the results claimed about the concavity of the value function 
and other classical properties. These findings suggests that existence issue still 
deserves further investigation and it may very well be the case to have inde­
terminacy with infinite horizon. Nevertheless concerning the structure of the 
model, the solution technique introduced and results obtained, our Avork is a 
new contribution to the literature when horizon is finite.
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There are some papers dealing with existence of equilibrium under increas­
ing returns but they are different in one important aspect; in the assumption 
on the type of increasing returns. They allow either an initial face of inreasing 
returns or an aggregate increasing returns with individual firms having CRS 
technology (external economies of scale). For example Majumdar an Mitra 
(1993) have some existence results for a djmamic optimization example with a 
non-convex technology in the case of a linear objective function but the con­
vexity is such that production function exhibits an initial phase of increasing 
returns.
.Jang-Ting Guo (1998) analyses indeterminacy with external economies of 
scale in a monetary economy with limited participation and he finds that the 
region of indeterminacy depends crucially on the (i)coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (ii)labor supply elasticity and (iii) the degree of increasing returns to 
scale. Therefore in this paper an existence result is not given which would 
make it comparable to our findings.
As it is mentioned in chapter 2 we have an existence result for n — period 
economy. However there are technical difficulties in solving the variables 
explicitly. A potential future research, in spite of the technical 
difficulties faced, would be to generalize our findings to cover infinite horizon 
or at least to n — period case and see its implications.
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